On March 30, PMC Research presented the findings of its research entitled Cybercrime in Georgia: Current Challenges and Possible Developments and subsequently held a discussion thereon.

Recently, we completed a project entitled Supporting an Inclusive Youth Policy by Establishing Sustainable Youth Platforms and Promoting Non-formal Education in Racha, in the course of which we established the Youth Assembly in the Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti region of Georgia, which conducts various activities dedicated to providing youth with opportunities, experiences, and the necessary theoretical and practical skills and competencies to support their full and successful integration into society. Such efforts were designed to enable them to become involved in decision-making processes at the local level through civic engagement mechanisms.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly becoming a part of our everyday lives, offering tremendous benefits for societies in terms of public governance, business development. and healthcare. However, it also raises some important economic, legal, and ethical questions. Hence, while governments have to create an AI-friendly eco-system, attract AI investors, boost the development of AI technologies, increase the industrial application of AI and, therefore, enhance AI-generated economic and social welfare overall, they should also elaborate policy frameworks to balance AI-associated risks that might be related to personal data protection, targeting, algorithmic discrimination, cybersecurity, and/or AI liability.

On March 12, we participated in the Connective Cities Network virtual global exchange on municipal responses to COVID-19 in public sectors, where we presented the findings of research undertaken in network cities in the area of governance, followed by presentations of specific cases from Tartu (Estonia) and La Paz (Bolivia) by the representatives of respective cities.

In this bulletin, a snapshot of remittance inflows into Ukraine pre-COVID is discussed, followed by its developments in 2020. According to the World Bank, global remittances will decline by 14% by the end of 20212, compared to the pre-pandemic level of 2019; In 2020, remittance inflows into Ukraine declined just by 0.3%, compared to 2019; Remittance inflows in Ukraine have been growing at an annual average of 8.2% over the past decade; The contribution of remittances to GDP in Ukraine amounted to 7.7% in 2020; The top senders of remittances to Ukraine in 2020 were Poland (26%), the United States (10%), and the United Kingdom (9%). In 2016-2019, the top senders were Poland (30%), Russia (12%), and the United States (8%); Remittances from Russia declined the most in 2020 (-20%), compared to 2019, while the United Kingdom recorded the strongest growth (69%) over the same period.

PMC Research has launched a new periodic publication entitled Sector Snapshots. Each issue focuses on a specific sector of the Georgian economy, observing developments with respect to key indicators of the given sector as a whole, the sector’s dynamics, its role in the overall economy, and, finally, financial indicators of companies within that sector.   The publication will produce valuable insights for businesses engaged in the covered sectors, as it lays out the trajectory of development for each sector and its possible financial bottlenecks, thereby contributing to more informed and efficient decision-making.  In the first issue of our new publication, we focus on Georgia’s microfinance sector.  In 2017-2019 new regulations on microfinance institutions (MFIs) entered into force, which significantly altered the landscape of the industry; Between Q1 2017 and Q4 2020, the number of MFIs and employees in the sector fell, with the former dropping to 40 and the latter to 4145 by Q4 2020 (52% and 16% decrease, respectively);   In Q4 2020, MFIs in Georgia held 1.48 bln GEL of assets and 0.98 bln GEL of liabilities. In this period, the consolidated assets and liabilities of MFIs increased, compared to Q4 2019 with a growth of 7% and 9%, respectively. Compared to Q1 of 2017, figures decreased by 10% and 22%, respectively; In 2020, gross income (revenue) of MFIs decreased, compared to 2019, and dropped by 13% to 814.9 mln GEL, while net income increased to 47 mln GEL. Moreover, the net income margin increased by 15 percentage points and reached 6%; In 2020, the total amount of loans issued by MFIs (both to individuals and to legal entities) amounted to 4.58 bln GEL, while the number of loans issued amounted to 2.71 mln loans, which is 4% and 26% decrease, respectively, compared to 2018. 

The number of international travelers declined by 75.3% in March compared to the same period of 2020, and by 90.7% compared to the same period in 2019. Meanwhile, the number of international visitors fell by 73.4% (2021/2020) and by 89.0% (2021/2019), and the number of international tourists fell by 64.4% (2021/2020) and by 84.4% (2021/2019); Saudi Arabia, the United States, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom rank as the top five countries of origin when it comes to highest average expenditure per visit; Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Armenia rank as the top five countries of origin when it comes to average expenditure per day; Targeting visitors from Turkey, via both air and land routes, could be an effective marketing strategy, at least in the short term; Due to the abnormal impact of the pandemic on 2020 prices, we use 2019 as the comparison year for the Hotel Price Index for the rest of 2021.

In Georgia, the average cost of a room in a 3-star hotel was 124 GEL per night in March 2021, while the average cost of a room in a 4-star hotel in Georgia was 219 GEL per night and the average cost of a room in a guesthouse was 80 GEL per night. The average cost of a room in a 5-star hotel in Georgia in March 2021 was 332 GEL per night. In Guria, the average price was 587 GEL, followed by Tbilisi - 436 GEL, Adjara - 295 GEL and Kakheti – 293 GEL.

PMC Research conducted a poultry cluster diagnostic study in Kvemo Kartli region of Georgia, and developed a cluster map, and elaborated short-term objectives as well as a long-term vision for the development of this cluster.  The study is part of the “EU Innovative Action for Private Sector Competitiveness in Georgia (EU IPSC)” program, which is a joint initiative of the European Union and the following four UN agencies: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 

PMC Research described both the history and the current reality for the marine fishing cluster in Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti region of Georgia, analyzed business operations within it, developed a cluster map, and elaborated short-term objectives as well as a long-term vision for the development of this cluster.  The study is part of the “EU Innovative Action for Private Sector Competitiveness in Georgia (EU IPSC)” program, which is a joint initiative of the European Union and the following four UN agencies: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 

PMC Research described both the history and the current reality for the hazelnut processing cluster in Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti region of Georgia, analyzed business operations within it, developed a cluster map, and elaborated short-term objectives as well as a long-term vision for the development of this cluster.  The study is part of the “EU Innovative Action for Private Sector Competitiveness in Georgia (EU IPSC)” program, which is a joint initiative of the European Union and the following four UN agencies: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 

The goal of this research is twofold. Primarily, it provides an assessment of the cybercrime situation in Georgia and projection of possible developments, as well as envisages policy recommendations for responsible public authorities. The secondary, but not less important goal is to facilitate awareness-raising through developing analytical information regarding problems and ways of their solutions. Georgian citizens are end victims who suffer from any national security threats including cybersecurity incidents and cybercrimes. Informing the public and raising awareness gain utmost importance, especially in conditions of hybrid threats. Social resilience could not be ensured without a wider engagement of informed and socially active citizenry. Key Findings Cybercrime is still an emerging phenomenon in Georgia, its damaging potential is not fully exposed and the threat is not perceived properly either by the government or the society; Highly likely cybercrime remains underreported in Georgia as in many other countries of our region; The MIA is focused on pure cybercrimes and does not calculate cyber-enabled crimes under cybercrime statistics that leaves room for ambiguity; From the perspective of criminal justice, policy cybercrime still does not expose serious challenge to society as its share in general criminal statistics is not significant; In the context of national security, cybercrime is more dangerous than other crimes as it represents an instrument of transformation of external threats into serious problems of internal security; Georgian Police handle cybercrime generally in a reactive manner, with more focus on response - investigation and pursuit, lacking a comprehensive preventive approach; LEA has certain problems in investigation and digital forensic, especially, in the regions; Lack of coordinated government policy, mature engagement of the private sector and low public awareness in the light of digitalization of social life, increasing internet and ICT access are main factors affecting cybercrime statistics negatively; Transnational criminal activities expose little danger to Georgia cybersecurity nowadays, but it`s predictable that GOCGs being an important part of transnational organized criminality, will increase their illegal activities in the digital space; Lack of sustainable financial support to develop key cybersecurity services and programs is observed; As main determinants affecting of raising cybercrime in Georgia are mostly generated through complex internal socio-economic and technological developments and external geopolitical processes and the GOG has limited capacity to influence significantly on most of those factors in a short-term perspective, it can be implied that in the nearest 5 years’ period, the trend of raising cybercrime rates in Georgia will be maintained. Highly likely cybercrime would be increased approximately by 25-30% per year in comparison to 2020 rates and gradually, it will easily overcome 5% share of total criminal cases registered by the police in 2022.   Recommendations Recommendation #1. More preventive, proactive and protective policy: Set up a comprehensive strategic agenda for cybercrime preventive measures. Georgia needs to develop not only reactive but also proactive measures for combating cybercrime; Change the approach of calculating cybercrime statistics to consider numbers of cyber-enabled crimes in total number of cybercrimes; Develop joint interagency task force from key government stakeholder institutions, equipped with strategic, operational and tactical tools, to unify efforts and undertake comprehensive and adequate measures for deterring external threats or mitigating the risks; Elaborate long-term strategy and action plan for combatting cybercrime, which will include capacity building, large-scale public awareness projects jointly organized by relevant government agencies (participation of the institutions responsible for implementing educational and youth policy is highly recommended); Draft and adopt legislative framework empowering the police for utilization ethical hacking and other proactive measures in cyberspace; Increase funding of cybersecurity dimension. Recommendation #2. Develop workforce and institutional capacity: Increase human and technological capacity of cybercrime investigators, especially at the regional level. Regular training programs with no gaps, as new sophisticated attacks require qualified people to deal with; Develop national training infrastructure for LEAs and security sector agencies to fill the gaps of human resources and facilitate professionalization of their personnel in cybersecurity, cybercrime investigation techniques and digital evidence; Increase efforts for participation in international exercises and trainings to increase international LEA cooperation with a special focus on combatting cybercrimes; Work more actively with LEAs of partner countries, international and regional law enforcement organizations in joint working groups and other platforms to detect activities of GOCGs in cyber sphere and be informed about possible threats; Create specialized cybercrime police units in every region of Georgia, equip them with special crime detection software and technical solutions that will increase early warning opportunities and increase other preventive technics; Equip and train enough police personnel properly for conducting tailored proactive policing measures countrywide. Recommendation #3. Develop cyber culture: Take active measures for public education and awareness, the empowerment of Georgian information society; reduce the success rate of many forms of cybercrime by educating individuals and organizations in recognizing criminal activity before they fall victim to it; Through various institutional frameworks achieve engagement of multiply government agencies having a large set of beneficiaries and active partnership with the private sector in the awareness-raising process to increase the outreach; Implement tailored educational campaigns for professional civil servants in cybersecurity, cyber hygiene and misinformation campaigns; Implement tailored and large-scale awareness-raising campaigns for the most vulnerable social groups; Share information about threats, best practices, specialized capabilities among stakeholders to build trust and demonstrate value for them; Raise awareness among decision-makers and senior management of LEAs to determine strategic priorities regarding cybercrime and electronic evidence. Recommendation #4. Co-share resources between CERT and MIA: Temporary secondment - assignment, transfer of LEA professional in CERT in order to get a hand-on experience of CERT incident collection and reporting, classification approaches, together define procedural and organizational formalities. On the contrary, CERT representative can be shifted to cybercrime office in order to get more insight into procedural powers, investigation techniques and assist the process with technical cyber know-how. This advice is vastly promoted by ENISA, Council of Europe as a cooperative tool between cybercrime and cybersecurity authorities; Adopt unified operational standards, develop the capacity of joint work; the experience of joint risk assessment teams of the MIA and the LEPL Revenue Service could be a useful example; Key steps required for information exchange between CERT and the police: Define a common taxonomy related to incidents and events in cybersecurity; Define an exchange standard to enable the sharing of information based on the taxonomy Create statistics based on the information exchanged. Recommendation #5: Connect, communicate and collaborate: Strengthen formal and informal cooperation frameworks to combat cybercrime in order to build an effective and sound governance system; Elaborate and adopt legislative requirements for the exchange of information between public and private sectors; Foster cooperation between the MIA and ISPs; Develop a secure information sharing platform for the exchange of information on cyber-threats and incidents between cyber authorities; Undertake measures (including legislative amendments) to increase informed and responsible engagement of the private sector in strengthening the country`s cyber resilience. Recommendation #6: Develop Cybercrime Reporting Mechanism: Establish a cybercrime reporting centre, hotline, providing a central point of contact for citizens and businesses; Develop coordinated mechanisms within the public and the private sector allowing citizens to report cybercrime cases, including online fraud, cyberstalking, child abuse online, identify theft, privacy and security breaches, etc.; Define common reporting methodology with written guidelines to broad stakeholder groups, including foreign counterparts; Launch awareness programs and communication campaigns to promote the regular use of reporting mechanisms by a wider community; Develop digital tools for cybercrime reporting.